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A B S T R A C T
The Automatic Identification System (AIS), fitted on most ships today, is primarily used for real time ship
monitoring. This paper illustrates how stored AIS data can be used to construct activity data that can be used to
normalize accident statistics, to turn recorded numbers of accidents into accident rates. We show, by way of
some examples, the potential in using AIS to construct different types of activity data, and discuss the advantage
of combining measures based on different activity data when monitoring accident trends or trying to identify
accident prone types of vessels. The analysis and discussion are based on a combination of the Norwegian
database of maritime accidents and 6 years of recorded AIS data.
The paper addresses methodological issues regarding the construction and use of these activity measures,
demonstrates how they can provide new knowledge both for researchers and authorities and outlines some
directions for further research.
1. Introduction
Consider a case where a maritime regulator observes an increased
number of groundings of a certain category of ships in their national
waters. This increase can for example be caused by deteriorating safety
standards on this ship type, or it may just be caused by the fact that
there are more of these ships sailing in their national waters, or that the
ships that are there are more active. The absolute number of accidents
provides the regulator incomplete information and directed regulatory
measures will be hard find. By using traffic data to normalize accident
numbers, thus constructing accident rates, provides opportunities for a
more nuanced understanding of risk than when employing only not-
normalized accident statistics. However, reliable data that reflect ac-
tivity have historically been scarce within shipping (see e.g. Ref. [1]).
As the Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracks ships and their
movement, stored AIS data can be a useful resource for normalizing
accident statistics. Normalization, in this context, essentially means
combining the number of accidents with the activity levels (see e.g.
Refs. [2–5]). It will be demonstrated in this paper how AIS can be used
to construct measures for activity that are useful for normalization of
accident numbers. When accident statistics are normalized the output is
commonly denoted as accident rates (or causality rates) (see e.g. Refs.
[6,7]). Such rates can again be used by different stakeholders in order
to monitor accident trends or identify accident prone vessel categories
or geographical areas, use it as input to quantitative risk analyses and
develop and risk indicators (cf. [8]).
The motivation for this paper comes from our prolonged collaboration
with Norwegian maritime authorities. The Norwegian Maritime Authority
(NMA) has over the years developed a detailed database of ship accidents
in Norwegian waters. As this only contains accidents, and does not have
records of activity beyond that, the NMA encounter problems when using
it to monitor the maritime risk level, and also for developing risk based
regulative strategies (cf. [9]). AIS-based normalization may contribute to
improving and expanding the knowledge base to these ends.
Every ship accident is unique with specific and complex causal
chains (see e.g. [10,11]). The methods developed here are not intended
for detailed studies of individual events. Rather, it is an exploration of
ways of including AIS-based measures of activity in the statistical
treatment of ship risk, primarily for regulatory purposes. As the theory
section will show, such measures are more common in other sectors
such as road and air transport.
AIS data have primarily been used for real-time traffic monitoring
and collision avoidance and has rarely been aggregated and combined
with accident statistics on a national level. The vast amount of data
generated by AIS provides some new and possibly better alternatives in
terms of analyzing and understanding maritime risk. Many of these op-
portunities are currently being explored in an emergent literature, some
of which will be discussed in section 2.1. AIS data has been employed in
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different ways in studies of maritime accidents [3–5, 11–19]. Several of
these and other applications of AIS have potential to improve the
knowledge base both for operators and regulators to better manage ship
safety. There is, to our knowledge, few publications that specifically
address and discuss the use of activity data obtained from AIS for nor-
malization. By way of some examples, various ways of using activity data
to construct accident rates and how they may be interpreted and made
useful from a regulatory perspective will be discussed. Importantly, there
are also methodological pitfalls both in the construction and application
of such normalized measures, that need to be discussed.
Due to space restrictions we will limit our exploration to two types
of ship accidents: groundings and allisions (unwanted contact with
immobile structures).2 Further, the focus is on two main vessel cate-
gories – cargo and passenger vessels.
The problems to be investigated are:
- How can AIS data be used to normalize accident statistics?
- How can different measures of activity be used individually and
collectively to broaden the basis for policy and risk based regula-
tion?
Additionally, drawing on experiences from our analyses, some
methodological advice on how to use AIS based activity data for nor-
malization is outlined.
As this paper discusses attempts to utilize AIS for normalization
purposes, the contribution is mainly a conceptual demonstration and
methodological contribution. Hence, it includes discussion of some of
the problems encountered and errors made in this first attempt. The
latter is important as a cautionary note for further research. The op-
portunities provided by big data may be dazzling, promising the “end of
theory”3 and a more (big) data driven science, but the cases illustrate
that the application of these data sets needs to be done with a keen eye
of the practicalities and governance of maritime operations. AIS pro-
vides a vast array of possibilities to construct activity measures.
Choosing those most suited for the purpose one is pursuing, rather than
the most convenient one for statistical purposes, will be crucial.
2. Background and theory
This section first discusses how AIS data have been employed for the
purposes of risk research and management in the maritime industry,
before focusing on the issue of normalization, assessing the state of the
art of normalization of accident data in the maritime industry and
comparing it with other transport sectors.
2.1. AIS data as an emerging resource for research and management of
maritime risk
AIS data is an information resource for different marine users [21],
used for e.g. traffic forecasting, navigation safety assessment, empirical
research, planning of infrastructure and policy making (see e.g. Ref.
[20]). A comprehensive literature review of application areas of AIS has
been conducted by Fournier et al. [22]. Based on 204 articles, they
divide between 4 main areas of application that have been addressed.
These areas are denoted as 1) maritime environment topics, 2) marine
safety, 3) security, and 4) Technical issues (including e.g. technical
equipment, data computing and data quality). In their literature review
of the use of AIS within the domain of maritime safety, Lensu and
Goerlandt [14] distinguish between articles focusing on operational use
of AIS (maritime surveillance), responses (to prevent accidents and
consequences), policy decision support, and fishery management. Ac-
cording to them, the earliest publications were exclusively about op-
erational use. More recently, policy-oriented use has gained more at-
tention.
AIS is an important tool supporting real time traffic surveillance,
conducted by traffic controller of fairways and sea areas [23]. In ad-
dition to the visual representations of ship movements, and information
regarding ship identity, position, track, speed, cargo also etc., models
have been developed to identify hazardous behavior among individual
ships (see e.g. [23–25]).
Judging by the number of publications, the use of AIS data as a basis
and input into risk models, especially related to collision and ground-
ings, has been the main area of research (see e.g. [17, 26–35]). Ac-
cording to Altan and Otay [36], based on their literature review, there
are two factors that are widely used in the risk models. This is obstacles
on the rout of the vessels and the failure of maneuvering (due to e.g. loss
of maneuver control, human errors, weather conditions, mechanical
failure etc.). Models for simulating traffic patterns and associated risk
has been developed by e.g. [37–39].
AIS is has turned out to be an important tool in accident investigation
due to the improve the information regarding contributing causes (see
[40]). Explorative analysis of conditions associated with navigation ac-
cidents, based on aggregated information from several ship, has been
conducted by several researchers (e.g. Refs. [4,5,11–19,41]). Some of
these explorative studies have been conducted to support risk modelling.
This also includes use of AIS data to obtain data to calculate different
types of accident frequencies relative to the traffic volume, e.g. number
of ship entries into sea areas [4] and sailed distance [18].
2.2. Normalization of absolute numbers and the selection of appropriate
activity data
The literature on the use of aggregated activity data within the area
of risk and safety studies is relatively scarce. Most is concerned with
how to apply activity data to construct measures of risk (e.g. Lost Time
Injuries, Fatal Accident Risk, etc.), describing the technical procedures
rather than discussing the relevance or validity of the data. The selec-
tion of activity measures has predominately been determined by the
availability of data, more so than their appropriateness (cf. [59,42]).
Normalization here refers to the adjustment of values measured in
order to make them appropriate for comparisons. It is a way of con-
trolling for specified conditions that are assumed to have an impact on
the absolute numbers. When comparing numbers of accidents, it is
reasonable to assume that the activity level is among those factors that
influence the absolute numbers, and by controlling for activity, it is
possible to identify differences that can be attributed to other factors.
Based on the assumption that the selected activity is associated with
accidents, activity is often referred to as exposure.4 In order to nor-
malize, it is necessary to have some sort of data that quantify the ac-
tivity level. Technically, normalization implies a calculation of accident
rates by using a simple equation where the absolute number of acci-
dents is the numerator, and the activity data the denominator.
Activity data can be obtained from different sources. In some cases,
there are “ready-made” activity data based on formalized reporting
systems. The availability of databases containing directly reported ac-
tivity data varies across industries. Especially within aviation, interna-
tional standardized reporting systems for activity data have been
2 AIS has great potential for monitoring risk of collisions, and real time sur-
veillance of it. The methods will, however, be somewhat different than those
discussed in this paper, e.g. using AIS to identify areas where traffic is dense
(e.g. [36]). Normalization of work-related personal accidents (i.e. occupational
accidents) is not included in the analysis, as the traffic data normally do not
yield a good estimate of exposure during on board activities such as main-
tenance.
3 See Ref. [90] for a discussion of this notion.
4 For example, it is reasonable to assume that working hours is a good mea-
sure of exposure to work related accidents, or that distance travelled in a car is a
good measure of the exposure to the risk of a car crash.
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implemented (see section 2.3). A more common approach is to obtain
activity data indirectly. In these cases, activity is constructed by the
transformation of other types of available data, such as e.g. calculation of
vehicle mileage by combining records regarding fuel consumption and
expected consumption per mile [43]. The use of AIS data also represents
an indirect approach, as data indented for real-time traffic monitoring
are aggregated and repurposed for statistical purposes. However, in
contrast to the aforementioned methods, AIS data directly represents the
navigational behavior of each single vessel (see section 3.1).
The possible practical applications of activity data and accident rates
are many. Hauer [44] see activity data as a mean to control for traffic
volume in order to compare different locations, seeking to identify the
most accident-prone. Related areas of application are to compare num-
bers of accidents associated with different categories of vessels, or spe-
cific characteristics of the vessels such as register state, classification
society, shipping company, type of activity, vessel design. Controlling for
activity level is also relevant when comparing numbers of accidents over
time in order to determine trends in the safety level and if other factors
may have influenced the accident rate across the specified time periods.
Other areas of application are quantitative risk analysis and risk
modelling (See e.g. Refs. [45,46] for reviews of maritime risk models).
For such investigations, activity data and accident rates are used to
estimate the probability of a certain type of accident (see e.g. Ref. [47]),
which combined with consequence measures constitute the notion of
risk (see e.g. Ref. [58] for a comprehensive discussion of the concept of
risk). Based on historical observations of absolute accident numbers
combined with exposure of the related activity, relative accident fre-
quencies are calculated and used as a probability measure. In risk
modelling, accident frequencies are also used in the validation and/or
calibration of the models.
As an extension of quantitative risk analysis it is also possible to use
activity data and normalized accident rates as lagging risk indicators. The
concept of a risk indicator represents measurable variables that correlate
with risk, appropriate to use as a representation of (future) risk (e.g.
Refs. [11,48–54]).
When quantifying risk based on accident statistics, the orientation
has typically been on obtaining activity data that quantify situations
(such as time, number of situations, distance sailed) in which there is a
probability that a certain type of accident may occur (see Ref. [42]).
This is reflected in the use of the term “exposure” to denote the activity
data. Exposure then, is a quantitative measure of the activity during
which an accident may occur [47], viz. situations where one is exposed
to hazard. From a risk perspective exposure can statistically be seen as
the number of stochastic “trials” and the number accidents as one of
several possible outcomes. Thus, quantification of exposure and acci-
dents, may be used to calculate the probability of an accident.
Within this paradigm, finding the most appropriate or “correct”
exposure measures - related to a certain type of accident - is therefore
important (see e.g. Ref. [47]). The premise for a perfect exposure
measure is that the number of accidents is proportional with the ex-
posure measure. If the exposure doubles the accident number doubles
[55,47]. However, using historical data to estimate risk (i.e. con-
ceptualized as a combination of the probability of future non-wanted
events and the belonging consequences) when studying complex sys-
tems that may be considerably transformed over time, is rather pro-
blematic. It is questionable that one can assume that each measurement
is a representation a stochastic “trial” which again can be used to es-
timate a true underlying probability.
In the literature, some correlations have been identified between
e.g. traffic millage (road traffic) and accidents [43], but there are also
studies indicating that there is not necessarily a linear relationship
between exposure and number of accident accidents. Persaud and
Musci [56] have shown that there could be certain factors that de-
termine the relationship between the assumed exposure data and the
numbers of accident, and that the calculated frequencies therefore
could be misleading.
Bjelland [55] has conducted series of regression analyses between
activity data and major accidents from Norwegian oil and gas industry,
aviation, and road transportation, in order to explore their relationship.
The study is conducted with reference to the context of probabilistic
risk analysis and the assumption of a positive linear relationship. He
includes a regression model with a negative relationship between
events and number of offshore installations, and he concludes that there
is no basis for asserting that there exists a positive linear relation be-
tween events and activity level. The analysis of the data from aviation
and road transportation support the same conclusion. However, the
data from the oil and gas industry shows that there has been a yearly
decrease in number of accidents and an increase in the activity level
measure. From an empirical perspective, conceiving activity data as a
mean of normalization, the findings of Bjelland [55] could simply be
interpreted as a decrease in accidents over a certain time period of time
when controlling for activity. The assumption about a relationship be-
tween the number of historical and the number of future accidents has
also been question been questioned by e.g. Rae [57] and Aven [58].
The difference between using activity data to estimate probabilities,
and to identify accident-prone subjects by controlling for the activity, may
be illustrated by using road transportation as a case. If one wants to use
historical data for calculating a probability of an accident, it might be
insufficient to use vehicle-kilometers travelled because the speed for dif-
ferent transport modes or types of drivers (e.g. age groups) will influence
the probability [59]. In contrast, when the ambition is to compare and
eventually rank accident-prone subjects, speed in this case becomes more a
question of several potential explanations for the observed differences.
Using activity data to normalize numbers of accidents presupposes
that the analysts employ their knowledge regarding the qualitative
characteristics of the activity and the accidents they scrutinize. For
instance, in commercial fixed wing aviation, the majority of the acci-
dent have typically occurred during take-off and landing [60,61]. Due
to this, it is reasonable to claim that numbers take-off and landings is a
more appropriate exposure measure when monitoring aviation acci-
dents, compared to the other measures.
2.3. Activity data used within different transport industries
Table 1 gives an overview of the most common activity measures
used within different transport industries. As the table shows, it has not
been common to use sailed distance and time in operation within the
shipping industry.
Data that reflect the activity level and the exposure to certain hazards
have historically been difficult to obtain within shipping, compared to
other transport industries. The lack of appropriate data, at least until the
introduction of AIS, partly explains why no international standard has
been developed for how to normalize accident data within the maritime
sector. Despite the limited access to data that indicate activity level, re-
searchers have tried to normalize maritime accident data by use of the
scarce available sources. For instance, length (kilometres) of coastline in
the defined areas has been used as activity measure (see e.g. Refs.
[1,75]). It could be argued that coastline length could serve in some
extent as an appropriate measure of activity when comparing geographic
regions, but it is obviously inappropriate if the ambitions is to compare
e.g. time periods, types of vessels, shipping companies, flag states etc.
The number of vessels is also used as an activity measure. In Great
Britain, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the
Department for Transportation has normalized fishing vessel accident
data by dividing the total number of accidents by number of registered
vessels [71]. In Norway, the Norwegian Maritime Authority (2016) has
normalized the absolute numbers of ship accidents involving Norwe-
gian vessels, by using number of vessels in Norwegian register as ac-
tivity measure. However, this activity data is limited to Norwegian
vessels, excluding all foreign vessels operating in Norwegian waters.
Within the scientific maritime accident research literature, numbers
of vessels have also been used as activity measures to compare different
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types of vessels (e.g. Refs. [2,18,73] and register states (e.g. Ref. [76]).
A different example of normalization is the work of Kujala et al. [3].
They have estimated yearly number of accidents in Finnish territorial
waters in proportion to port arrivals. Sormunen et al. [4] have also used
number of port calls as activity data to normalize collision and
grounding accidents, and numbers of ship crossings into the Gulf of
Finland. Jin et al. [64] have been able to calculate yearly accident rates
of fishing vessels operating in different geographical areas in North
American waters by combining data regarding vessel activity from the
Commercial Fisheries Database system and accident data from the
Coast Guard. They have chosen to normalize the accident data by di-
viding the yearly number of accidents by vessel days.
The remainder of this paper will discuss different activity measures
for comparison of accident rates (over time and between ship cate-
gories) in the context of shipping and some of their pros and cons for
different purposes.
3. Methods and data
This section provides an overview of how different types of activity data
has been obtained and constructed by the use of AIS messages, and how
these measures have been used to normalize absolute numbers of accidents.
3.1. Constructing the activity data
The AIS is a radio transmitter placed on all ships over 300 gross
tonnes, and several smaller ships. In 2000, the International
Maritime Organization implemented a requirement for AIS, effective
from 2004 [77]. The AIS reports the position of the ship, some data
about the specific voyage (e.g. destination, cargo, estimated time of
arrival) and an array of static data about the ship.5 These standar-
dized messages are received by other ships and land based stations
(as well as a few satellites) at short intervals (seconds to minutes).
The primary usage of AIS is collision avoidance and real-time
tracking of ships. Anyone with a computer, a smart phone or a
dedicated device can view them real-time. Vessel Traffic Centrals
(VTS) and other ships use AIS to monitor traffic. The data is also
stored in databases, in Norway managed by the Coastal Adminis-
tration.
The AIS transmitters send both dynamic position messages and
static messages (see e.g. Refs. [78,25]). The intervals between the
different position messages vary with between 2 s and 3 min. The
ship static messages are transmitted every 6 min. Since ship's static
message includes information regarding the identity of the vessel by
reporting the MMSI numbers, and the IMO number, it can then be
used to harvest further information from international databases.
Both the information about the ship's identity, and the position data
have been used to construct the following activity data discussed in
this paper: (1) Sailed distance (nautical miles), (2) Hours of op-
erations, (3) Number of vessels and (4) Number of port calls.
Sailed distance (nautical miles) is obtained by measuring, for each
unique vessel visible in AIS, the cumulative distances between each
vessel position given in the AIS position reports. The data is then ag-
gregated into the preferable ship categories and divided by defined
geographical areas6. The short time intervals between each position
report makes it fair to assume that the calculated distances are rea-
sonably accurate. High speed and/or many bearing changes may,
however, compromise this accuracy somewhat. As the tracks are linear
interpolations between data points it is not unusual that some AIS
tracks cross land in coastal areas, for example if a fast-moving boat
turns a cape between two position registrations.
Hours of operations is constructed by summing, for each unique
vessel identity, the hours that the AIS have been transmitting signals
within a defined period of time. These data can then be aggregated into
the preferable ship categories. This method is based on the assumption
that an active AIS indicates that the vessel is in operation. The validity
of this assumption may be questioned, due to an uncertainty whether
the activation of AIS always reflects activity on board.
Number of vessels is constructed by counting the number of unique
vessel identities transmitted by static AIS messages (IMO number,
MMSI number) within a defined area (in our case vessels within the
Norwegian baseline). Note that this number counts every vessel that has
been in this area for the given year.
Number of port calls is calculated by an algorithm based on an as-
sumption that every period of immobility of an individual vessel that
lasts for more than a certain period within the Norwegian baseline and
implies that the vessel is visiting a harbor [79]. The defined minimum
time period that define a port call varies between different vessels types,
due to differences in operations7 (e.g. port time for ferries and HSC lasts
only a few minutes, whereas e.g. tankers normally need more time).
Based on the algorithm using the position reports, periods of relative
immobility are reported as port calls. These are then automatically
Table 1
Common activity data measures used within different transport industries.
Shipping Railway Aviation Road traffic
Activity frequency - Numbers of port calls [3-
5]
– - Number of flights
- Numbers of departures
- Numbers of landings [61-63]
–
Time spent on activity - Numbers of vessel days
[64]
– - Flight time (hours) [63] –
Distance - Nautical miles sailed [65] - Train distance
- Car distance [66-68]
- Flight distance
- Flight distance per passenger
[1,60,63]
- Vehicle mileage/km
[43,47,59,69,70]
Number of subjects - Number of vessels
[2,18,65,71-73]
– – - Number of vehicles
- Numbers of licensed drivers
[59,74]
Extent of infrastructure - Km coast line in a defined
area [1,75]
- Km of railroad tracks in a
defined area [1,8]
– –
5 This includes: MMSI number and IMO number, name of the ship, type of
ship, dimensions (length and width), draft, port of origin.
6 The defined geographical area was Norwegian continental shelf and the
Norwegian exclusive economic zone. This area was further divided into activ-
ities outside and inside the Norwegian baseline, as well as activities within
different fjords. The activity data used in this present paper includes all activity
within the Norwegian baseline.
7 Due to the fact that data reduction is avoided, the parameters regarding
speed and time may be modified.
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checked for proximity against a list of coordinates of ISPS harbors.8 Visits
at ISPS harbors and visits at unknown harbors are counted for each in-
dividual vessel. The accuracy of the calls at unknown harbors is con-
sidered to be lower, especially for some ship categories such as e.g.
fishing vessels. “Inactivity” among fishing boats may also reflect fishing
operations. Furthermore, independent of vessel type, one may also as-
sume that a grounding will be counted as a port call. However, we have
validated the method manually, inspecting whether reported port calls
are reasonable. And for the ship categories discussed here, the vast ma-
jority of counted port calls seem legitimate.
Common for all these four constructed activity data measures is that
the quality can be compromised by 1) insufficient AIS coverage in some
areas, 2) vessels without AIS transmitters, and 3) vessels with AIS that
are sailing without transmitting.
While these weaknesses might be problematic while studying one
single ship, they are insignificant when looking at larger data sets. The
AIS coverage in Norwegian waters is generally good, and for the ship
categories we have studied having an AIS installed and operational is
legally required.
Our method of aggregation of data was flexible, preserving all data
for individual ships (no data reduction), so that we could continuously
refine categories and also develop new ones depending on the issue to
be studied. This implies e.g. that ship taxonomies, defined geographical
areas of activity, time criteria for assumed port call could be changed
without the necessity of “re-obtaining” the AIS data. See Kleiven [79]
for a technical note describing this process.
3.2. Obtaining accident data
The accident data is obtained from the MNA accident database [9],
limited to Norwegian waters during the time period 2010–2015. The
database contains all reported marine accidents involving all vessels
sailing under Norwegian flag, and all foreign vessels operating in
Norwegian waters. The marine accidents registered in the data base are
categorized into 13 different accident types. In our project, we studied
the following 5 major accident types; (1) collisions, (2) groundings, (3)
fire and explosions, (4) allision and (5) capsizing.
In addition to information regarding type of accident, each event in
the database contains information that can be divided into the fol-
lowing themes; vessel identity (vessel name, IMO number, MMSI
number, call sign, shipping company, classification society and flag
state), vessel description (type of vessel, gross tonnage, hull material,
length, with, year of construction, etc.), geographical information (co-
ordinates of the accident, port of departure, arrival port, type of water),
accident description (data, time, damage on vessel), operational de-
scription (number of people on board, number of crew members, type
of cargo, speed of vessel etc.), and weather conditions (visibility, wind
directions, wave heights etc.).
All of these different types of information may be used to create ca-
tegories that can be compared with regard to differences in accident rates.
In this project the data was prepared especially for comparisons between
types of vessels, classification societies, flag states, age of the vessels, defined
geographical areas along the Norwegian coast, seasons, months and years.
The vessel taxonomy used in the official database (types of vessels)
does not refer to any international standard. The taxonomy is complete
(ensured by the use of several “other vessels” categories), and the cate-
gories are mutually exclusive, but there are apparently no consistent,
unique classificatory principles in use. The latter conditions may be ex-
plained as a consequence of a pragmatic inclusion of new vessel cate-
gories during the years, when the present ones were considered as in-
sufficient. This implies that the ship categories constitute a
nomenclature, rather than a taxonomy (see e.g. Ref. [80] for an outline of
classification principles). Because of these weaknesses – a new vessel
taxonomy was developed as a part of the NSRM project, referred to as the
NSRM taxonomy (Fig. 1, see Ref. [9] for details). We developed a three-
level taxonomy using the activity of the vessels as the classificatory
principle.9 This was done by an adaptation of NMA taxonomy and the
international StatCode5 ship coding system. A translation matrix was
developed between these 3 different taxonomies. The use of StatCode 5
ship coding system was not considered as a viable option due to some
rather questionable and non-documented structures in the hierarchy of
subordinate categories.10 However, due to the translation matrix and our
method that ensured the preservation of raw data from each individual
ship, it was possible to apply any of these 3 vessel taxonomies.
Repurposing AIS data (primarily intended for real-time surveil-
lance) and accident data (primarily intended for national regulatory
monitoring) into combined statistics introduces a need for harmoniza-
tion of categories. The work of developing harmonized taxonomies to
combine databases should not be underestimated when using big data
for risk management (see Ref. [9]). As in the case with the NMA acci-
dent database, categories are the results of historical choices done for
specific purposes. Categories are also influenced by politics: For ex-
ample, in Norway it is highly relevant for regulators to develop separate
categories that operate for the oil industry and the aquaculture in-
dustry, as these sectors sail under additional regulatory regimes, while
this might be less important in other countries [9].
3.3. Combining activity data and accident data
The potential of combining AIS data with other data sources has
been addressed by e.g. Tsou [21]. In the area of risk and safety research.
Similar combination of AIS data with other dataset has been conducted
by e.g. Lensu, & Goerlandt [14].
The key to the process of combining the accident data and the ac-
tivity data is the IMO number and the MMSI number. This is informa-
tion that are common both in the AIS data (static AIS report) and in the
accident reports. The IMO and MMSI numbers obtained from the AIS
data, are matched with the database of IHS Fairplay which gives us
information about the vessel type according to the StatCode 5 tax-
onomy. The StatCode 5 categories are then translated into the cate-
gories used in both the NSRM and the NMA taxonomies, by the use of
the translation matrix.
In addition, IHS Fairplay provides information that is also in the
MNA accident database, such as classification societies, flag states, gross
tonnage and year of construction. In order to distinguish between activ-
ities within different geographical regions, the information regarding
the coordinates of the AIS position reports are matched with predefined
geographical areas [9].
The information obtained from AIS and IHS Fairplay are used to
constitute categories used for aggregating activity data from each in-
dividual ship in the total population of vessels in Norwegian waters. This
aggregation is done without data reduction. This means that our com-
bined data set, categorized for combining AIS-data with accident data,
always contains the original categorizations of the ships and the full data
sets about its sailing patterns and full records about the accidents. This
makes it possible to alter existing or construct new aggregated categories
used for comparison if this is deemed necessary later on.
8 Ports covered by the IMO regulation of international port security called the
“International Ship and Port Facility Security Code”. This means all harbors
allowed for international traffic.
9 For example, a supply boat working for the petroleum industry will be ca-
tegorized on the three levels as cargo vessels, offshore vessels, supply vessels.
10 E.g. it was seen as incorrect for our purpose to consider a “well boat”, an
important category of cargo ships serving the aquaculture industry in Norway,
to belong to the high-level category of “fishing vessels”. These vessels do not
conduct any fishing activities. They transport living fish for the aquaculture
industry and, though they have fish on board, they have more in common with
cargo ships in terms of activity patterns.
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Each accident registered in the NMA database is aggregated into the
same ship categories as the activity data by the use of matching in-
formation and categories in the database, and the translation matrix
between the 3 different vessel taxonomies. An overview of the combi-
nation of databases is given in Fig. 2.
As described in section 2.2, the calculation of accident rates associated
with the different categories is rather straight forward, using the number
of accidents as a numerator, and the activity data as denominator.
4. Results
In the following analyses, some rather simple examples are chosen,
with high level categories of ships, and the most frequent types of ac-
cidents. This is done in order to focus here on the methodological and
theoretical discussions primarily, to show the potential in these com-
binations of data, and how they can be interpreted and not primarily
the calculated accident rates.
Two applications of normalization are discussed: how normalized
data can contribute to monitoring of the development of the number of
accidents over time and how normalized data can be used to make
comparisons between ship types in terms accident rates.
4.1. Selected cases
To demonstrate the utility of AIS for normalization and implications
of choices of different activity measures, a limited set of cases listed in
Table 2 are pursued. The table includes a description of the reasons for
the case selection.
4.2. Trending
4.2.1. Trending: groundings among cargo ships
Trends using absolute numbers (blue) and normalized results are
shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3a)–d) displays the absolute numbers of groundings and the
normalized frequencies by use of a) number of ships, b) hours in op-
eration, c) nautical miles sailed, and d) number of port calls as de-
nominator, each year in a six-year period. The numbers are for the total
number of Norwegian (NOR11) ships in the cargo category. These
curves illustrate how different forms of normalization affects the trend
curve.
The general trends look quite similar when we compare the different
normalized frequencies based on different measures of activity.
Furthermore, the shape of trend lines of the different normalized fre-
quencies is also quite similar to the trend of the absolute numbers.
One explanation for the similarities in shape between the non-nor-
malized and the normalized curves is that there are only relatively
small, slowly occurring changes in fleet composition, sailing distances
etc., and consequently that the number of accidents dominates the
equation from year to year. When monitoring the development over
time, especially on aggregated categories like this, normalization does
not lead to dramatic change in the overall trends.
There has been a decrease in the different normalized frequencies if
Fig. 1. NSRM vessel taxonomy.
11 NOR is the ordinary ship register of Norway, whereas NIS is an open reg-
ister (with Norwegian flag), counted here as an international category.
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we compare 2010 with 2015, whereas the absolute number has had
minor, insignificant, increase. When using the normalized frequencies
to monitor grounding accidents, it is reasonable to interpret the results
– in this specific example – as a reflection of a safety improvement,
whereas when observing the absolute numbers, not controlling for ac-
tivity, one would assume that such an improvement has not occurred
during the period.
4.2.2. Groundings among passenger ships
Quite similar trends are also observed when comparing absolute
numbers and different normalized frequencies using groundings among
passenger ships as an example, Fig. 4a)–d). Still, the trends for this
category show some differences that could be subject to further in-
vestigation. Most notably, the trend in curve d) is flat for the last three
years while there is an increase in absolute numbers, suggesting that
there is an association between port calls and groundings that could
need further inspection. While the absolute numbers show a significant
increase between 2013 and 2015 (27%), groundings per mill nautical
miles, groundings per port call and per million hours in operations have
decreased (respectively 1%, 26% and 28%). Groundings per 1000 ships
has increased with 1%. These results imply that the number of port calls
and hours in operations have increased considerably, compared to the
numbers of groundings during this time period. Nautical miles sailed
and number of vessels have increased at approximately the same
magnitude as the increase in groundings. When trends for normalized
results differ from the trend in absolute numbers (as with number of
port calls and hours in operation here) this suggests, a fact one should
be aware of, that the correlation is not always stable.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the combination of databases.
Table 2
Cases used in the present analysis.
Case Motivation
1. Trending: Grounding, cargo ships. Number of groundings normalized against several
measures of activity: Number of ships (in AIS database), Number of port calls. Sailed
distance. Hours of operations.
The trends for a 6 year period are studied.
Grounding is the most common incident and cargo ships the category with most
ships. As such the n is high even for single years. We discuss how different forms of
normalization affect the trends for the most common ship and incident category. The
relevance for monitoring these incidents is also high since they are of the most
common incidents.
2. Trending: Grounding for Passenger ships.
Number of ships (in AIS database), Number of port calls. Sailed distance. Hours of
operations
Here we expand the monitoring of case 1 with including another ship type.
3. Comparison: Norwegian vs Flags of convenience.
-Number of ships
-Sailed distance
Comparison of 6 year aggregates
As above. Differently flagged ships have different working conditions and are
regulated differently. A common concern in the public debate is that ships flying flags
of convenience may have higher risk levels. We discuss how normalization of incident
data can help us investigate that.
This comparison is elaborated with discussions of patterns of activity and of reporting
practices.
4. Comparison: Ferries and High-speed crafts. Allision
Comparison of 6 year aggregates. All normalization factors.
These ship types have similar regulatory regimes and framework conditions. Their
activity is also quite similar. This case is selected to illustrate how the comparison
between ship classes are sensitive to which normalization factor is chosen (see Fig. 2).
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4.3. Comparison
In the following section different ship types are compared using
different measures of activity. While it appears that different measures
applied to the same vessel category, as done above, do not yield dra-
matic differences in the sense that the overall trends are largely quite
similar, this is not the case when using different normalization factors
for comparing different ship types. Instead of trends, 6 year averages
(2010–2015) are used here.
4.3.1. Comparing groundings among cargo ships and passenger ships
Fig. 5 is a comparison of a 6 years average for normalizations by the
use of different activity data. The absolute number of groundings are
approximately the same. The cargo vessels have considerably more
groundings per port call and almost twice as many groundings per sailed
distance. However, when using number of vessels and hours of operation
as denominator, passenger ships have a higher grounding frequency.
Again, the results illustrate the importance of the choice of activity
data when monitoring accident statistics. While using absolute numbers
might have given a regulator concerns about the navigation skills in the
passenger ship category, other normalized frequencies would draw
more attention to cargo ships.
In the theory section we noted that there has, historically, been a
tendency to pragmatically use the activity data that are readily available
for normalization. The results here illustrate the potential pitfalls in such
a strategy. Choosing one normalization measure will skew the results
Fig. 3. Groundings for Norwegian cargo ships normalized against different measures of activity: a) per 1000 ships, b) per mill hours in operation c) per 1 mill nautical
miles sailed, d) per 100.000 port calls.
Fig. 4. Groundings for Norwegian passenger ships normalized against different measures of activity: a) per 1000 ships, b) per mill hours in operation c) per 1 mill
nautical miles sailed, d) per 100.000 port calls.
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when comparing categories of ships that have different activity patterns.
4.3.2. Comparing grounding among Norwegian and foreign ships
From the perspective of maritime authorities, the comparison of
accident rates among ships belonging to different flag states is often
regarded as important in terms of monitoring and regulating the vessel
activities. The issue of flag and accident risk has also been a recurrent
theme in the research literature (see e.g. Refs. [76,81–85) and in public
debate. Our example is a comparison of groundings among Norwegian
and foreign vessels.
When looking at the aggregated number of accidents from 2010
through 2015 (Fig. 6), NOR vessels have more than twice as many
groundings per year as foreign vessels in Norwegian waters. When
normalized by sailed distance, the grounding frequency for Norwegian
cargo vessels is twice the frequency of foreign vessels. By using hours in
operation and number of port calls as denominator, the differences
between the two groups becomes considerably less. The differences in
the magnitude of the frequencies when using different normalization
factors could partly be explained by differences in the fleet composition
between Norwegian and foreign ships, as well as their activity pattern.
If we normalize these accident numbers by using number of ships,
the grounding frequency for NOR ships is more than 15 times higher
than the equivalent number for foreign ships. This has a technical ex-
planation that requires some further elaboration before we go on to
discuss the other factors. This large difference is at least partly ex-
plained by the fact that there are many more unique foreign vessels
visiting Norwegian waters, than there are NOR ships operating along
the coast. Most NOR ships operate all year along the coast while many
foreign ships only pass through or enter Norwegian waters for a short
visit. Our algorithm for constructing number of ships, counting all un-
ique IDs registered by the AIS each year, skews this comparison as it
generates an artificially high number of foreign ships. It will count the
activity contribution of a foreign ship visiting for one day on equal
terms with a NOR ship operating every day for a full year in Norwegian
waters. To correct this, we recommend that the number of ships is
calculated in other ways for these purposes. A new algorithm will be
proposed in section 5.3.1.
The grounding frequency is approximately twice as high for NOR
ship when sailed distance is used in order to calculate a frequency. The
difference is lower when hours of operations are used. This may reflect
that the Norwegian vessels in average holds a higher speed when they
are in operation (operations hours include time at ports). When using
number of port calls as denominator, the relative difference in
grounding frequency is even lower. This may reflect that the foreign
vessels in average have longer sea passages than Norwegian vessels.
Based on this comparison of the different types of normalized fre-
quencies, the number of ships, as calculated by our algorithm, is clearly
not an appropriate activity measure when comparing vessels categories
that move in and out of our selected geographical area of analysis.
Still in our example, independent of which exposure data in use,
foreign vessels seem to be less accident-prone when we evaluate
grounding frequencies. An obvious interpretation is that foreign vessels
are less prone to groundings than Norwegian vessels. However, the
observed difference may also be attributed to other conditions. The
frequencies are for example not controlled for differences in the fleet
composition, in the sense that the high level category of cargo ships for
Norwegian and foreign vessels contains quite different types of more
specified vessel types accompanied by different operational patterns.12
Differences in reporting practices and regulatory control may also be a
factor. The NOR ships sail in the waters controlled by their own regulators
whereas the internationally flagged ships, according to international law,
are subject to their own flag state regulators, meaning that these ships are
subject to different regulatory and inspectorial regimes (see e.g. Refs.
[81,86]). Thus the observed differences in the grounding frequencies
between these categories may be attributed to different degrees of un-
derreporting among respectively Norwegian and foreign vessels. Under-
reporting accidents is in general a rather widespread phenomenon within
shipping [11,87,88] and it is reasonable to assume that foreign vessels
have less incentives to report accident to Norwegian authorities, com-
pared to Norwegian ships, that are more closely monitored by their reg-
ulators. As long as an accident occurs in areas without traffic surveillance
(e.g. VTS centres13), and it is not necessary to call for external assistance
to handle the situation, the information about the occurrence is entirely
dependent on reports from the vessels. Traces from accidents may be
detected during e.g. port state controls (e.g. damages on hull), but these
inspections (for each individual foreign vessel) occur seldomly, at best
every 5th month. Further, there are several vessels conducting innocent
passages through Norwegian waters, from Russia to Europe.
To investigate potential underreporting as a source of this differ-
ence, we supplemented our analysis with an investigation of the re-
lative frequencies for accidents of different severities. For all ground-
ings, the frequency of foreign and NIS vessels combined are 54% lower
than the frequency for NOR vessels. If we only use those grounding
accidents rated with high consequences in the accident database, i.e.
Fig. 5. Comparison of groundings for NOR registered cargo ships and passenger
ships using 6 year averages.
Fig. 6. Comparison of averages of accident rates for NOR and foreign cargo
ships from 2010 to 2015 in Norwegian waters. Note that numbers for grounding
per 1000 ships are based on an error that will be discussed further.
12 The high-level vessel category of “cargo vessels” consist of various types of
vessels, including e.g. dry cargo carriers, container ships, bulk carriers, tankers,
coasters, offshore support vessels and small work support vessels. It is reason-
able to assume that the Norwegian and the foreign fleet has a different com-
position and, due to this, a different activity pattern. Also, it is reasonable to
assume e.g. that foreign ships would have a relatively higher proportion of
vessels involved in deep sea international traffic, compared to the Norwegian
cargo fleet. Norwegian vessels categorized as of cargo vessels includes e.g. re-
latively more offshore supply vessels, fish farming support vessels and other
smaller work vessels. Foreign vessels are dominated by tankers, bulk, container
and dry cargo vessels.
13 There are relatively large sea areas in Norway without surveillance from
Vessel Traffic Service centres. There is e.g. no surveillance between the Lofoten
island and the fjords close to Bergen. This represents a distance of about 500
nautical miles.
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accidents that are serious enough that Norwegian authorities have been
involved (e.g. rescue operations) the relative difference between NOR
and foreign and NIS vessels declines. In the case of minor and serious
groundings, the frequency of NOR vessels are 45% higher than foreign
and NIS vessels. If only serious groundings are taken into account,
foreign and NIS vessels have a frequency that are 40% higher.
Fig. 7 shows different normalized grounding frequencies for Norwe-
gian and foreign cargo vessels with all groundings, only groundings with
serious and minor consequences14 and only groundings with serious
consequences are used as nominator (and sailed distance as denominator).
It shows that the grounding frequency is lower for foreign ships than
for Norwegian ships when using all groundings as nominator and serious
and minor consequences, but becomes lower when only the most serious
ones are counted. Although this could imply that grounding accidents
among foreign vessels are relatively more often associated with serious
damages, compared with grounded NOR vessels, a more plausible in-
terpretation - with reference to the research on underreporting [87,88] -
is that foreign ships have a higher degree of underreporting to the
(Norwegian) costal state authorities, than NOR ships sailing in their own
home waters, when confronted with less serious groundings.
The results illustrate that one should be careful to compare ship
types with different activity patterns and different incentives to report
incidents. This example shows how differences in the fleet composition
and/or the activity pattern, as well as reporting practices, between
vessels belonging to different categories may influence, respectively,
the normalization factors and the reported number of accidents. This
underlines the necessity of a thorough assessment of the comparability
between the different categories compared. One solution is to strive for
more specific and comparable categories (with regard to the type of
vessel and activity). However, a more fine-grained categorization will
result in a smaller number of accidents (nominator), which could
contribute to compromise the validity of the comparison.
4.3.3. Comparing allision among ferries and high-speed passenger vessels
The results in the previous section illustrate that one should be
careful to compare ship types with radically different activity patterns
and different incentives to report incidents. In this section we have
chosen to compare two vessel types whose activities are more and who
sail under quite similar regulatory regimes (and thus would be expected
to have roughly the same reporting practices). Both ferries and high-
speed passenger vessels report relatively many allisions, mainly “con-
tact damages” on the vessel or the ferry dock.
When we compare the average number of allisions from 2010 until
2015, ferries have more than 5 times as many as HSCs (see Fig. 8). When
using hours in operations as activity data, the relative difference is
smaller, and the allision rate becomes almost twice as high for ferries
compared to high speed passenger vessels. When sailed distance is used
as the activity measure, the relative difference becomes higher. These
differences between normalizations with different activity measures is
probably caused by the fact that we are comparing slow moving ferries
with high-speed crafts covering longer distances. When we use the
number of port calls, the allision rates almost equalize.
When we know that the hazards associated with these accidents
predominately are associated with port calls, it is rather obvious that the
number of port calls is the most adequate activity data. When used to
calculate allision rates, this gives us information that alter the image we
had when just inspecting the non-normalized numbers of allisions within
these two vessel categories, or when using other normalization factors.
5. Discussion
Monitoring of changes in accident rates and identifying accident
prone subjects is vital for decisions regarding allocation of scarce pre-
ventive resources. This holds for the maritime industry, for other
transport industries and policy makers and regulators. Historical acci-
dent data is an important source of information to this end, and these
statistics are also prominent in official reports. To make such data
comparable over time and between categories of ships, some form of
normalization is needed. Records of previous accidents must be turned
into rates. We have demonstrated an approach for harvesting activity
data from the AIS system that can be used for normalization purposes,
and where several different normalization factors can be chosen.
AIS data makes it possible to gather information about vessels and
traffic that is not easily obtained by other sources. This is especially re-
levant when monitoring the operation of vessels in international waters
or within the territorial waters of another state, and when vessels are not
making a port call and are not obliged to report their activity to the state
authorities (e.g. in the case of innocent passage). As noted by Almklov
and Lamvik ([81]:181) international ships sail under a “veil of obscurity”
seen from the stance of coast state authorities. Systematic use of AIS data
is one of the ways through which more knowledge about their activities
and the risk they pose can be understood.
This paper has demonstrated the potential but also some of the pit-
falls when utilizing AIS data. Normalization is a task that cannot be left
to algorithms or experts in statistics. It is necessary to include maritime
expertise in the process, as each evaluation must be done with a keen eye
on the operational conditions in the maritime sector, and to what pur-
pose one wants to use the statistics. It might be tempting to, for example,
use sailed distance as a standard normalizing factor for all categories of
maritime transport. Intuitively this will be a good benchmark for the
industry as a whole.
However, this choice will skew attention towards certain categories
(those sailing short distances along in coastal waters for example) as risk
objects, while others (sailing longer stretches off the coast) will receive less
attention. In the theory section we discussed the tendency in earlier re-
search to work with what you got, to use the activity data that are at hand
with little explicit reflection on the relationship the activity measure and
accident type. With the manifold of opportunities provided by AIS in terms
of normalization, such choices can now be made more purposefully.
5.1. Discussion of the normalization factors
Four different normalizations factors based on AIS data, number of
ships, hours in operations, nautical miles sailed and number of port
calls, have been employed in this discussion. These were used to ana-
lyze trends and compare different categories of ships. In some instances,
when monitoring trends, the different normalization factors give quite
different results in terms of the magnitude of the change in the fre-
quencies, while the results are strikingly similar across different activity
measures in other cases. Such differences can be attributed to the
Fig. 7. Grounding per 10 mill nm sailed divided by severity of the groundings.
14 Serious consequences are groundings causing severe damage on the vessel
(e.g. hull, propulsion), environmental spills, severe damage on properties of
external parties, and/or injuries among the crew members. Minor consequences
are groundings causing minor damages on the vessels, without reducing the
integrity of the hull or the propulsion.
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relationships between the accidents and different forms of activity, to
what degree they represent exposure. This underscores two important
points: The users of accident rates should have a good understanding of
maritime activities, so that they can make sound evaluations of whether
measures of activity represent exposure. Secondly, this understanding
should also be employed when finding the normalization factor that
best represents the activity one wants to control for when normalizing.
When comparing between different categories of vessels it is im-
portant to evaluate the comparability of the categories. Our analysis
shows how differences in the fleet composition and/or operational
patterns can influence the normalization factors (denominators) and by
this the validity of the comparison. The opportunity to interpret dif-
ferent forms of normalization in combination not only helps choosing
the one that is most “fair” for comparison, but also holds potential for a
deeper investigation of which activities that are associated with the
specific accident type. This is for example seen in our comparison of
cargo and passenger ships, where differences between normalization by
sailed distance and port calls indicates that there are differences in
terms of operational patterns that skews the comparison.
There are some general issues of validity to be consider. For ex-
ample, the metric “hours of operation” has some potential weaknesses
as a measure for activity, as AIS transmitters might be turned off or
signals may be lost even if there is activity going on. There are also
some validity issues related to the number of port calls, as some false
port calls may be produced by the algorithm (see section 3.1). Still, as
constructs, they have a strong face validity.
Moreover, differences in reporting practices between the categories
that are compared may contribute compromise the raw accident data
and hence the comparability of the calculated frequencies.
5.2. What can AIS–based normalization be used for?
As addressed in section 2.2, the combination accident data and
activity data may have different areas of applications. First, it is used to
control for a defined activity when monitoring trends over time. This is
done determine to what degree a trend in accident numbers represents
change in the safety level or if it is caused by changes in exposure.
Secondly, it is used to control for a defined activity when comparing
numbers of accidents associated with different categories of vessels, or
specific characteristics of the vessels (such as register state, classifica-
tion society, shipping company, type of activity, vessel design etc.). This
is primarily done to identify accident-prone subjects, geographical lo-
cations or specific characteristics of the vessels. Thirdly, activity data
and accident frequencies are used to estimate probabilities of future
accidents and applied in estimation of risk. In this paper the attention
has been directed towards the first two applications.
It is part of the maritime authorities’ mandate to seek to understand
causes for changes in absolute number of accidents. For them, monitoring
normalized numbers such as groundings per sailed distance, will be more
adequate than raw numbers, and it will also allow for more “fair”
comparisons between ship categories if appropriate measures of activity
are chosen.15 Both for authorities and researchers different forms of
normalization will be suitable based on the question one seeks answer to.
In our examples, trends seen in the normalized longitudinal mon-
itoring versus the development in actual numbers have been relatively
similar as the changes in the denominator are small from year to year
when the fleet is relatively stable. However, in some examples the
normalized accident frequencies show a different trend compared to the
absolute numbers. These differences illustrate that the conclusions
drawn from monitoring absolute numbers and different normalized
frequencies respectively may lead to quite different conclusions.
However, though this paper illustrates the potential in using AIS for
normalization, our examples also illustrate pitfalls that must be con-
sidered when applying them:
1) By applying activity measures that do not match the exposure. For
example, sailed distance, which is arguably is a good measure for
many purposes, is a poor measure for the exposure to allision which
is better covered by port calls.
2) By using common activity measures that skews the comparison be-
tween vessel types with different operational patterns.
Also, normalized measures, though potentially more precise than raw
numbers, may be harder to interpret, as they require some understanding
of how the measures of activity are developed. While no normalization
factor is perfect, the opportunity to choose from several possible factors,
and even using them in combination, is an improvement from the current
situation. Having access to different activity data for normalizing the
same phenomenon has a potential in terms of triangulation that may
strengthen the validity of the interpretations of the frequencies. If dif-
ferent activity data gives frequencies that shows somewhat similar trends,
it is reasonable to say that they support common conclusions. Cases of
discrepancy, however, call for a more thorough interpretation process,
and may be highly informative in themselves. More measures of activity
to choose from expands the toolkit for interpretation, but also requires
competence to understand their weaknesses.
5.3. Recommendations for further research and development
It is possible to develop algorithms that are better indicators of ac-
tivity than those used for this paper. It is also possible to identify activity
data related to different types of vessel operations (e.g. fishing, anchor
handling, cable laying etc.), and types of sea passage (e.g. innocent pas-
sages, freight areas) based on the movement pattern of different vessels
(see e.g. Refs [89,12]). This will help to secure activity data that is more
closely associated with certain types of hazards and accidents (cf. [47]).
This paper has focused on the combination of activity data with the
Norwegian accident database. There are however also applications of the
activity data themselves, beyond risk management. For example, one can
easily construct measures, combining activity data without including
accidents, such as sailed distance per port call. These can then be com-
pared between different ship categories (thus better understanding dif-
ferences in operational patterns) or monitored over time to study
changes in these patterns. For example, when doing such simple calcu-
lations, we observe a 17% decrease in sailed distance per port call from
2010 to 2015 for cargo ships, suggesting that ships in average sail shorter
passages in 2015. Such applications, though not the scope of this paper
illustrate the potential for use of aggregated AIS data for traffic analysis.
This geographical area in this analysis has been fixed. A very
Fig. 8. Allision rates compared for high-speed crafts and ferries.
15 For authorities with responsibility of e.g. emergency management, en-
vironmental damages and rescue operations, monitoring the actual numbers of
accident in different areas will typically be the most important numbers to
watch, since this is what they need to know to dimension their emergency re-
sponse capacities.
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interesting extension of this study is to compare different areas, either
within the area that has been discussed here or to compare Norwegian
waters to other areas or national waters. To preserve a high N, and as
our paper is mainly illustrative, we have worked mainly with high level
categories here. However, particularly if one employs this method for
areas with more ships and more accidents, it will be highly useful to
conduct more detailed analyses using sub-categories of ships - such as
specific flags or ship types.
Based on the discussion in section 3, we recommend that data re-
duction is avoided when constructing joint databases of accident data
and activity data, since explorative analyses might necessitate adjust-
ment of categories.
5.3.1. How to count the number of ships?
The measure for number of ships requires some further attention in
future research. Prior to our project the NMA's normalization factor was
the number of registered ships subsumed under its inspection regime.
This was a purely administrative number, only counting Norwegian
ships, and not reflecting the actual fleet sailing in Norwegian waters. In
our analysis using AIS for normalization we counted the number of
ships that had been registered in the Norwegian AIS database, that is,
all ships that have been in Norwegian waters the year in question. This
also proved to be problematic, particularly in the comparison of
Norwegian and foreign vessels. While the majority of NOR flagged
vessels can be expected to stay in Norwegian waters for most of the
time, an international vessel often visits Norwegian waters only briefly
but will still be counted as one vessel for the year in question. This
generates an artificially high denominator in the normalization equa-
tion where the number of accidents involving foreign ships in a year is
divided by the number of foreign ships in Norwegian waters that year.
This difference between Norwegian and foreign ships can be com-
pensated for by adjusting the algorithm generating the activity mea-
sure. It will be more appropriate to generate an average of how many
ships of each category are in Norwegian waters every given day. Thus
the adjusted algorithm will be:
1. Count number of international and NOR ships registered each day
for an entire year.
2. For each category, summarize these and divide them with 365 to
obtain a yearly average of the daily fleet composition.
Thus, one can still employ our counting algorithm, but by reducing
the time interval to a day and averaging these over a year, we greatly
reduce the error caused by the fact that counting the number of unique
identities for a year creates an impression that there is more activity by
foreign ships in Norwegian waters than there actually is.
Such problems, in hindsight one can even call them errors, illustrate
some of the pitfalls when extracting big data for these purposes. There
might be systematic tendencies in the activity data that will lead to
errors if they are aggregated by algorithms without the necessary
quality control.
6. Conclusions
AIS provides new opportunities for obtaining activity data. AIS data
make it possible, as we have shown, to construct new measures of ac-
tivity. These can, in turn, be used to normalize accident data into fre-
quencies or accident rates parallel to those used in other transport in-
dustries. This paper has illustrated that such rates can be used to
compare categories of ships and to monitor accident statistics over time.
As our examples have shown, however, it is necessary to have a thor-
ough understanding of ship types and their activities to select appro-
priate activity measures. A wider range of measures for activity on
which to normalize accident data makes it possible to construct more
sophisticated and fit-for-purpose accident rates. There is no “best”
normalization factor for all purposes. Rather, the choice of factor
depends on the questions one is seeking answers to. As such, this con-
tribution, by exploring a wider variety of normalization factors, in-
creases the number of questions that may be answered. Also, by means
of triangulation, combined analysis of the results using different forms
of normalization, it can provide an improved statistical understanding
of the causes of incidents.
This paper presents our methodological approach and some ex-
amples of how AIS data can provide a stronger basis for risk monitoring
and management in the maritime industries. The potential for further
exploration of this is great.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research in the project National Ship Risk
Model, funded by the Research Council of Norway (grant no 239111)
and co-funded by the Norwegian Maritime Authority and the
Norwegian Coastal Administration. We are also greatly indebted to
Eivind Kleiven and Trond Kongsvik.
References
[1] G. Rausland, Storulykker innen passasjertransport globalt i perioden 1991-2003.
[Major accidents within passenger transport globally in the period of 1991-2003]
RISIT-report. SINTEF, (2004).
[2] E. Eleftheria, P. Apostolos, V. Markos, Statistical analysis of ship accidents and
review of safety level, Saf. Sci. 85 (2016) 282–292.
[3] P. Kujala, M. Hänninen, T. Arola, J. Ylitalo, Analysis of marine traffic safety in the
Gulf of Finland, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 94 (2009) (2009) 1349–1357.
[4] O.V. Sormunen, M. Hänninen, P. Kujala, Marine Traffic, Accidents, and
Underreporting in the Baltic Sea, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w
Szczecinie, 2016.
[5] O.V. Sormunen, M. Hänninen, J. Häkkinen, A. Posti, Tanker grounding frequency
and spills in the Finnish Gulf of Finland, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w
Szczecinie (2015) 108–114.
[6] X. Liu, M.R. Saat, C.P. Barkan, Analysis of causes of major train derailment and their
effect on accident rates, Transp. Res. Rec. 2289 (1) (2012) 154–163.
[7] S.E. Roberts, Fatal work-related accidents in UK merchant shipping from 1919 to
2005, Occup. Med. 58 (2) (2007) 129–137.
[8] J. Winter, Safety in Numbers: Evaluating Canadian Rail Safety Data, SPP Research
Paper, 2014 6-2.
[9] E. Blix, R. Bye, E. Kleiven, P. Almklov, T. Kongsvik, H. Gåseidnes, V. Berntsen, What
is a ship? Ship categories and application of AIS data and accident statistics for the
normalization of ship risk, Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems:
ESREL 2015 (2015) 315.
[10] S. Haugen, P.G. Almklov, M. Nilsen, R.J. Bye, Norwegian national ship risk model,
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime Technology and
Engineering-MARTECH, CRC Press, 2016.
[11] R.J. Bye, A.L. Aalberg, Maritime navigation accidents and risk indicators: an ex-
ploratory statistical analysis using AIS data and accident reports, Reliab. Eng. Syst.
Saf. 176 (2018) 174–186.
[12] F. Goerlandt, H. Goite, O.A.V. Banda, A. Höglund, P. Ahonen-Rainio, M. Lensu, An
analysis of wintertime navigational accidents in the Northern Baltic Sea, Saf. Sci. 92
(2017) 66–84.
[13] F. Goerlandt, M. Hänninen, K. Ståhlberg, J. Montewka, P. Kujala, 25. Simplified
Risk Analysis of Tanker Collisions in the Gulf of Finland. Miscellaneous Problems in
Maritime Navigation, Transport and Shipping, Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea
Transportation, 2011, p. 181.
[14] M. Lensu, F. Goerlandt, Big maritime data for the Baltic Sea with a focus on the
winter navigation system, Mar. Policy 104 (2019) 53–65.
[15] A. Mazaheri, J. Montewka, P. Kotilainen, O.V.E. Sormunen, P. Kujala, Assessing
grounding frequency using ship traffic and waterway complexity, J. Navig. 68 (1)
(2015) 89–106.
[16] A. Mazaheri, J. Montewka, P. Kujala, Correlation between the ship grounding ac-
cident and the ship traffic — a case study based on the statistics of the Gulf of
Finland. TransNav, The International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of
Sea Transportation 7 (2) (2013) 119–124.
[17] J.M. Mou, C. van der Tak, H. Ligteringen, Study on collision avoidance in busy
waterways by using AIS data, Ocean Eng. 37 (2010) 483–490.
[18] T.O. Nævestad, R. Phillips, B. Elvebakk, R.J. Bye, S. Antonsen, Work-related acci-
dents in Norwegian road, sea and air transport: prevalence and risk factors. TØI
Report, (2015), p. 1428.
[19] W. Zhang, F. Goerlandt, P. Kujala, Y. Wang, An advanced method for detecting
possible near miss ship collisions from AIS data, Ocean Eng. 124 (2016) 141–156.
[20] R.L. Shelmerdine, Teasing out the detail: How our understanding of marine AIS data
can better inform industries, developments, and planning, Mar. Policy 54 (2015)
17–25.
[21] M.C. Tsou, Online analysis process on Automatic Identification System data ware-
house for application in vessel traffic service, Proc. Inst. Mech. Eng. M J. Eng. Marit.
Environ. 230 (1) (2016) 199–215.
R.J. Bye and P.G. Almklov Marine Policy 109 (2019) 103675
12
[22] M. Fournier, R.C. Hilliard, S. Rezaee, R. Pelot, Past, present, and future of the sa-
tellite-based automatic identification system: Areas of applications (2004–2016),
WMU J. Maritime Affairs 17 (3) (2018) 311–345.
[23] B. Idiri, A. Napoli, The automatic identification system of maritime accident risk
using rule-based reasoning, 2012 7th International Conference on System of
Systems Engineering (SoSE), IEEE, 2012.
[24] P. Jiacai, J. Qingshan, H. Jinxing, S. Zheping, An AIS data visualization model for
assessing maritime traffic situation and its applications, Proc. Eng. 29 (2012)
365–369.
[25] A. Felski, K. Jaskólski, P. Banyś, Comprehensive assessment of automatic identifi-
cation system (AIS) data application to anti-collision manoeuvring, J. Navig. 68 (4)
(2015) 697–717.
[26] F. Cucinotta, E. Guglielmino, F. Sfravara, Frequency of ship collisions in the strait of
messina through regulatory and environmental constraints assessment, J. Navig. 70
(5) (2017) 1002–1022.
[27] P.A. Silveira, A.P. Teixeira, C. Guedes Soares, Use of AIS data to characterise marine
traffic patterns and ship collision risk off the coast of Portugal, J. Navig. 66 (6)
(2013) 879–898.
[28] A. Maimun, I.F. Nursyirman, A.Y. Sian, R. Samad, S. Oladokun, Using AIS data for
navigational risk assessment in restricted waters, Transportation Systems and
Engineering: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications, IGI Global, 2015,
pp. 1154–1163.
[29] K.I. Kim, G.K. Park, J.S. Jeong, Analysis of marine accident probability in Mokpo
waterways, J. Korean Navig. Port. Res. 35 (9) (2011) 729–733.
[30] I. Asmara, P. Sindhu, E. Kobayashi, T. Pitana, Simulation of collision avoidance in
lamong bay port by considering the PAW of target ship using MMG model and AIS
data, Marine Eng. Front. 2 (2014) 31–38.
[31] M.B. Zaman, E. Kobayashi, N. Wakabayashi, A. Maimun, Risk of navigation for
marine traffic in the Malacca Strait using AIS, Proc. Earth Planet. Sci. 14 (2015)
33–40.
[32] M.B. Zaman, E. Kobayashi, N. Wakabayashi, T. Pitana, A. Maimun, Implementation
of Automatic Identification System (AIS) for Evaluation of Marine Traffic Safety in
Strait of Malacca using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), J. Japan Soc. Naval Arch.
Ocean Eng. 16 (2013) 141–153.
[33] M.B. Zaman, E. Kobayashi, K. Sahbi, N. Wakabayashi, A. Maimun, Fuzzy FMEA
model for risk evaluation of ship collision in the malacca straits: based on AIS data,
J. Simul. 9 (2013) 1–14.
[34] Z. Xiang, Q. Hu, C. Shi, A clustering analysis for identifying areas of collision risk in
restricted waters, TransNav Int. J. Marine Navig. Safety Sea Transport. 7 (1) (2013)
101–105.
[35] J. Ylitalo, Modelling Marine Accident Frequency, Master’s thesis Alto University
School of Science and Technology Faculty of Information and Natural Science,
2010.
[36] Y.C. Altan, E.N. Otay, Spatial mapping of encounter probability in congested wa-
terways using AIS, Ocean Eng. 164 (2018) 263–271.
[37] P. Last, M. Kroker, L. Linsen, Generating real-time objects for a bridge ship-handling
simulator based on automatic identification system data, simulation modelling
practice and theory, Simul. Modell. Practic. Theor. 72 (2017) 69–87 https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.simpat.2016.12.011.
[38] K.G. Aarsæther, T. Moan, Estimating navigation patterns from AIS, J Navig. 62 (4)
(2009) 587–607.
[39] F. Xiao, H. Ligteringen, C. Van Gulijk, B. Ale, Comparison study on AIS data of ship
traffic behavior, Ocean Eng. 95 (2015) 84–93.
[40] Y. Wang, J. Zhang, X. Chen, X. Chu, X. Yan, A spatial–temporal forensic analysis for
inland–water ship collisions using AIS data, Saf. Sci. 57 (2013) 187–202.
[41] F. Olindersson, C.E. Janson, J. Dahlmann, Maritime Traffic Situations in
Bornholmsgat, TransNav Int. J. Marine Navig. Safety Sea Transport. 9 (1) (2015)
115–120.
[42] A.C. Wolfe, The Concept of Exposure to the Risk of a Road Traffic Accident and an
Overview of Exposure Data Collection Methods, (1982).
[43] R. Chapman, The concept of exposure, Accid. Anal. Prev. 5 (2) (1973) 95–110.
[44] E. Hauer, On exposure and accident rate, Traffic Eng. Control 36 (3) (1995).
[45] M. Hassel, Risk Analysis and Modelling of Allisions between Passing Vessels and
Offshore Installations, Ph.D. Thesis NTNU, Trondheim, 2017.
[46] G.J. Lim, J. Cho, S. Bora, T. Biobaku, H. Parsaei, Models and computational algo-
rithms for maritime risk analysis: a review, Ann. Oper. Res. (2018) 1–22.
[47] R. Elvik, Some implications of an event-based definition of exposure to the risk of
road accident, Accid. Anal. Prev. 76 (2015) 15–24.
[48] O.A.V. Banda, F. Goerlandt, A STAMP-based approach for designing maritime safety
management systems, Saf. Sci. 109 (2018) 109–129.
[49] O.A.V. Banda, M. Hänninen, J. Lappalainen, P. Kujala, F. Goerlandt, A method for
extracting key performance indicators from maritime safety management norms,
WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 15 (2) (2016) 237–265.
[50] J. Dyreborg, The causal relation between lead and lag indicators, Saf. Sci. 47 (4)
(2009) 474–475.
[51] S. Haugen, J. Seljelid, O.M. Nyheim, S. Sklet, E. Jahnsen, A generic method for
identifying major accident risk indicators, Presented at ESREL 2012, June, Helsinki,
Finland, 2012.
[52] T. Kongsvik, S.Å.K. Johnsen, S. Sklet, Safety climate and hydrocarbon leaks: an
empirical contribution to the leading-lagging indicator discussion, J. Loss Prev.
Process. Ind. 24 (4) (2011) 405–411.
[53] T. Kongsvik, Sikkerhet I Organisasjoner (Safety in organizations – in Norwegian.),
(2013) Trondheim: Akademika).
[54] T. Kongsvik, P. Almklov, J. Fenstad, Organisational safety indicators: some con-
ceptual considerations and a supplementary qualitative approach, Saf. Sci. 48 (10)
(2010) 1402–1411.
[55] A. Bjelland, Sammenheng mellom risiko-og aktivitetsnivå: en studie av en allment
akseptert antagelse i risikoanalyser (Relationship between risk and activity level: a
study of a widely accepted assumption in risk analyzes) (Master Thesis), University
of Stavanger, Norway, 2010.
[56] B.N. Persaud, K. Mucsi, Microscopic Accident Potential Models for Two-Lane Rural
Roads, (1995) Transportation Research Record, (1485).
[57] D. Rae, Risk and safety indicators, in: N. Möller, S.O. Hansson, J.E. Holmberg,
C. Rollenhagen (Eds.), Handbook of Safety Principles, vol. 9, John Wiley & Sons,
2018.
[58] T. Aven, Risk assessment and risk management: review of recent advances on their
foundation, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 253 (1) (2016) 1–13.
[59] A.S. Hakkert, L. Braimaister, I. Van Schagen, The Uses of Exposure and Risk in Road
Safety Studies vol. 2002, SWOV Institute for Road Safety, 2002.
[60] R. Bye, S. Johnsen, G. Lillehammer, Addressing differences in safety influencing
factors—a comparison of offshore and onshore helicopter operations, Saf. Now. 4
(1) (2018) 4.
[61] F. Netjasov, M. Janic, A review of research on risk and safety modelling in civil
aviation, J. Air Transp. Manag. 14 (4) (2008) 213–220.
[62] ICAO, Safety report, https://www.icao.int/safety/Documents/ICAO_SR_2017_
18072017.pdf Web resource, (2017) , Accessed date: 11 July 2019.
[63] UK CAU, Global Fatal Accident Review 2002 to 2011, Report: UK Civil Aviation
Authority, 2013.
[64] D. Jin, H.L. Kite-Powel, E. Thunberg, A.R. Solow, W.K. Talley, A model of fishing
vessel accident probability, J. Saf. Res. 33 (2002) 497–510.
[65] T.O. Nævestad, E. Caspersen, I.B. Hovi, T. Bjørnskau og, C. Steinsland,
Ulykkesrisikoen Til Norskopererte Godsskip I Norske Farvann (The accident risk of
Norwegian operated ships in Norwegian waters.), Institute of Transport Economics,
Oslo, 2014 TØI Report 1333/2014.
[66] A.W. Evans, Fatal train accidents on Britain's main line railways, J.R. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 163 (1) (2000) 99–119.
[67] A.W. Evans, Fatal main line accidents, Mod. Railw. 58 (630) (2001) 23–27.
[68] D.H. Schafer, C.P. Barkan, Relationship between train length and accident causes
and rates, Transp. Res. Rec. 2043 (1) (2008) 73–82.
[69] R. Elvik, Major transportation accidents in Norway: assessing long-term frequency
and priorities for prevention, Transp. Res. Rec.: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board 1969 (2006) 101–106.
[70] A.W. Evans, Estimating transport fatality risk from past accident data, Accid. Anal.
Prev. 35 (2003) 459–472.
[71] MAIB, Report on the Analysis of Fishing Vessel Accident Data 1992 to 2000, Report:
Marine Accident Investigation Branch Department of Transport, UK, 2002.
[72] Norwegian Maritime Autority, Focus on Risk 2016, Norwegian Maritime Authority,
Haugesund, 2016.
[73] H. Rømer, L. Brockhoff, P. Haastrup, H.J. Styhr Petersen, Marine transport of
dangerous goods. Risk assessment based on historical accident data, J. Loss Prev.
Process. Ind. 6 (4) (1993).
[74] S. Lyman, E.R. Braver, Occupant deaths in large truck crashes in the United States:
25 years of experience, Accid. Anal. Prev. 35 (5) (2003) 731–739.
[75] M. Rausand, I.B. Utne, Risikoanalyse: Teori Og Metoder (Risk analyisis: Theory and
method – in Norwegian), Tapir Akademisk Forlag, 2011.
[76] T. Alderton, N. Winchester, Flag states and safety: 1997-1999, Marit. Policy Manag.
29 (2) (2002) 151–162.
[77] IMO, AIS transponders, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/
Pages/AIS.aspx Web resource, (2016) , Accessed date: 11 July 2019.
[78] M.A. Cervera, A. Ginesi, On the performance analysis of a satellite-based AIS
system, 2008 10th International Workshop on Signal Processing for Space
Communications, IEEE, 2008, October, pp. 1–8.
[79] E. Kleiven, Application of AIS Data to Accident Statistics Normalization, Technical
Note Safetec Nordic/NTNU Social Research (2016) https://samforsk.no/
Publikasjoner/ST-10310-2%20Application%20of%20AIS%20data%20to
%20accident%20statistics%20normalization.pdf , Accessed date: 11 July 2019.
[80] G.C. Bowker, S.L. Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, MIT
press, 2000.
[81] P.G. Almklov, G.M. Lamvik, Taming a globalized industry–Forces and counter
forces influencing maritime safety, Mar. Policy 96 (2018) 175–183.
[82] K.X. Li, J. Yin, H.S. Bang, Z. Yang, J. Wang, Bayesian network with qualitative input
for maritime risk analysis, Transportmetrica: Transp. Sci. 10 (2014) 89–118.
[83] K.X. Li, J. Yin, L. Fan, Ship safety index. Transportation research part A: policy and
practice, 66 (2014) 75–87.
[84] K.X. Li, J. Wonham, Who is safe and who is at risk: a study of 20-year-record on
accident total loss in different flags, Marit. Policy Manag. 26 (2) (1999) 137–144.
[85] K.X. Li, The safety and quality of open registers and a new approach for classifying
risky ships, Transp. Res. E Logist. Transp. Rev. 35 (2) (1999) 135–143.
[86] E.R. DeSombre, Flagging Standards: Globalization and Environmental, Safety, and
Labor Regulations at Sea, MIT Press Books, 2006, p. 1.
[87] M. Hassel, B.E. Asbjørnslett, L.P. Hole, Underreporting of maritime accidents to
vessel accident databases, Accid. Anal. Prev. 43 (6) (2011) 2053–2063.
[88] G. Psarros, R. Skjong, M.S. Eide, Under-reporting of maritime accidents, Accid.
Anal. Prev. 42 (2) (2010) 619–625.
[89] E.N. de Souza, K. Boerder, S. Matwin, B. Worm, Improving fishing pattern detection
from satellite AIS using data mining and machine learning, PLoS One 11 (7) (2016)
e0158248.
[90] R. Kitchin, Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts, Big Data & Society 1
(1) (2014) 2053951714528481.
R.J. Bye and P.G. Almklov Marine Policy 109 (2019) 103675
13
